The Iraqi Impasse:  Sustaining Economic Reconstruction During War-Time by Looney, Robert E.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2006-12
The Iraqi Impasse:  Sustaining
Economic Reconstruction During War-Time
Looney, Robert E.
International Journal on World Peace, Vol. XXIII, No. 4, December 2006.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/40856
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE
VOL. XXIII NO. 4  DECEmbER 2006 




In a significant policy statement1 
released toward the end of 2005 the 
United States outlined its strategy for 
victory in Iraq. Victory is defined in 
terms of a sequential set of completed 
goals: (1) Short term, Iraq is making 
steady progress in fighting terrorists, 
meeting political milestones, building 
democratic institutions, and standup 
security forces; (2) medium term, Iraq 
is in the lead defeating terrorists and 
providing its own security, with a fully 
constitutional government in place and 
on its way to achieving its economic 
potential; and () Longer term, Iraq 
is peaceful, united, stable and secure, 
well-integrated into the international 
community and a full partner in the 
Economic recovery is important for 
stability and peace in Iraq. The Iraq 
Study Group proposed financial 
aid to Iraq of around $5 billion 
annually, while President Bush has 
increasingly stressed the importance 
of job creation in that country. 
Unfortunately, significant economic 
progress in Iraq is unlikely unless 
part of a comprehensive strategy is 
designed to overcome several forces 
currently impeding reconstruction 
and economic recovery: (a) the 
growth and dynamics of the shadow 
or informal economy, (b) the 
deterioration in social capital,  and 
(c) the evolving relationship between 
tribes, gangs and the insurgency. The 
dynamic interrelationship between 
these factors is causing a downward 
economic spiral. Progress in one or 
two areas alone will not be capable 
of generating significant economic 
gains. All of these factors need to be 
addressed.
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war on terrorism.
The US strategy is essentially three pronged: developing democracy, 
providing security and reviving the economy. In the economic area U.S. 
and coalition efforts have focused on helping Iraq restore the country’s 
neglected and damaged infrastructure with the goal of restoring and 
expanding essential services. Other objectives include: the creation of a 
market based economy, and greater transparency and accountability in the 
public sector.2
Iraqis themselves have become increasingly skeptical of the ability of 
this strategy to produce lasting economic gains and a semblance of stabil-
ity. Certainly the ability to complete infrastructure projects on time and 
within budget has proven to be a nearly impossible task. As noted by the 
U.S. Inspector general for Iraq Reconstruction infrastructure programs 
in that country have been plagued by “violence, corruption and misman-
agement.” As a result, “the ambitious US reconstruction effort in Iraq is 
likely to fall far short of its goals because soaring security costs and poor 
management have slashed the amount of American money available for 
rebuilding projects.”4 Just as serious is the all too apparent long lead time 
before any tangible benefits in terms of improved living standards are seen 
by the average Iraqi.
 Implicit in Ambassador bremer’s assessment is that the main flaw in 
the US strategy has been its inability to deliver short-run economic gains to 
large segments of the Iraqi population. Also complicating Iraq’s recovery 
is the fact that we still don’t have a complete picture of the contemporary 
dynamics of the Iraqi economy. Clearly, factors such as the “brain drain” 
and the lack of commercial credit5 together with uncertainty due to the 
security situation have largely brought investment in the formal segments 
of the economy to a halt.6 
A third of Iraq’s professional class is reported to have fled to Jordan, a flight 
of skills worse than under Saddam. UN monitors now report 2,000 people 
a day are crossing the Syrian border. Over a hundred lecturers at baghdad 
University alone have been murdered, mostly for teaching women. There 
are few places in Iraq where women can go about unattended or unveiled. 
gunmen arrived earlier this month at a baghdad television station and 
massacred a dozen of the staff, an incident barely thought worth report-
ing. The national museum is walled up. Electricity supply is down to four 
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hours a day. No police uniform can be trusted. The arrival anywhere of 
an army unit can be prelude to a mass killing…. All intelligence out of 
Iraq suggests this is no longer a functioning state.7
Yet, from anecdotal accounts8 there are indications that many areas 
of the shadow economy are prospering and, as during the period of sanc-
tions, successfully adapting to the harsh environment. On the other hand, 
the shadow economy has provided a boon to criminal gangs and a major 
source of funding for the insurgency.9 
The importance of economic recovery was again stressed in the Iraq 
Study group’s assessment of conditions in Iraq:10
No political and security progress can be sustained in Iraq unless the Iraqi 
people experience improvement in their daily lives. This will demand sub-
stantial progress on simple tasks like clearing garbage; as well as complex 
tasks like rebuilding a shattered oil industry and establishing law and order. 
To achieve these goals, Iraq will need assistance from the United States 
and other countries that want to prevent a further slide towards chaos.
While the Iraq Study group proposes financial aid to Iraq of around 
$5 billion per annum, it is silent on the strategies likely to be most effec-
tive in sustaining economic recovery and growth. With these themes in 
mind, the purpose of the sections that follow is to attempt to gain an 
understanding of the forces at work in Iraq impeding reconstruction and 
economic recovery. 
economIc DynamIcs of posT-War Iraq
Our working hypothesis is that any efforts to restore the economy will be 
conditioned by a number of interrelated factors including: (a) the growth 
and dynamics of the shadow or informal economy, (b) the deterioration in 
social capital, and (c) the evolving relationship between tribes, gangs and the 
insurgency as conditioned by the dynamic interactions with (a) and (b). 
The shadow economy
When coalition officials arrived in Iraq after the war, they planned on turn-
ing Iraq into a free market economy—a model for capitalism in the middle 
East.11 As part of this plan, they expected private companies, both foreign 
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and domestic, to play a leading role in jump-starting the economy. Free 
market incentives driven by pent-up demand and a massive aid-financed 
reconstruction program were thought to be sufficient to induce a massive 
wave of investment and hiring of Iraqi workers.12 but violence, crime and 
uncertainty over the future have undermined investor confidence, prevent-
ing market-driven mechanisms from playing their anticipated role. As a result 
nominal gDP contracted by about 5 percent in 200. It has recovered 
little since then, despite the U.S.-led reconstruction efforts. 
The only part of the economy to have survived both Saddam Hussein 
and the post-200 period of instability and insurgency is the country’s infor-
mal economy. In fact, there is ample evidence that the country’s informal 
economy has expanded considerably 
since Saddam’s overthrow. In this 
regard, Iraq’s informal economy is 
following a pattern seen in other 
parts of the world—the informal 
economy tends to grow during 
periods of political, economic, and 
social crisis. 
Despite the obvious importance 
of the informal economy, it is barely 
mentioned in the many official eco-
nomic reports. In fact, few systematic 
attempts have been made to integrate 
the analysis and quantification of the 
informal economy into an overall review of economic and military develop-
ments in Iraq. This gap in our knowledge has hindered the development 
of a systematic framework for understanding and planning reconstruction 
and counterinsurgency strategies in the contemporary Iraqi setting.
Preliminary analysis1 suggests a clear pattern exists whereby the rela-
tive size of a country’s informal economy (as a share of gross National 
Product) is related to its progress in opening up to the world economy. 
Those countries that are relatively closed and inward-oriented (like Iraq 
around the year 2000) tend to have large informal economies, while those 
countries open to the pressures of globalization have much smaller informal 
economies. Furthermore, the informal sector becomes significantly smaller 
The only part of the 
economy to have sur-
vived both Saddam 
Hussein and the post-
2003 period of instability 
and insurgency is the 
country’s informal econ-
omy. In fact, there is 
ample evidence that the 
informal economy has 
expanded considerably.
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as countries increase their control over corruption. 
As might have been expected, Iraq under Saddam was in a group 
of countries with the highest probability of possessing a large informal 
economy. The profile of these countries is an inward-oriented trade regime 
with high levels of corruption. On this basis, Iraq’s shadow or informal 
economy probably accounted for around 5 percent of gross Domestic 
Product (gDP) in 200014 with nearly 70 percent of the labor force employed 
in informal activities. 
Since the fall of Saddam, Iraq’s informal economy has been affected by 
that country’s on-going crisis. Clearly, conflict and the insurgency have taken 
a heavy tool on the formal economy. As private firms or public enterprises 
are downsized or closed due to conflict, retrenched workers often find the 
informal sector the only source of livelihood. Also, in response to conflict-
driven inflation or cutbacks in public services, households have often needed 
to supplement formal sector incomes with informal earnings. In some parts 
of the country such as al Anbar, the breakdown of law and order has led to 
an expansion of criminal activity, some of which is carried out in the shadow 
economy—street vendors selling stolen merchandise, etc. 
A partial list of factors contributing to the current expansion of Iraq’s 
shadow economy includes:
•	 Compared with the previous regime, there is considerable political 
liberalization in Iraq. In transition economies, this normally results 
in a larger informal economy.
•	 The demand for services and trade is particularly high due the 
introduction of free trade soon after the fall of the Hussein regime. 
Again, this factor would encourage the development of an informal 
economy—petty retailing, street vending of imported goods, etc.
 •	Increased bureaucratic discretion and associated corruption are 
greatly contributing to the informal economy.
•	 because of Iraq’s insurgency, institutional enforcements have weak-
ened, thus allowing the incentives for informal activity to become 
very high.
•	 The underdevelopment in the rule of law and related institutional 
enforcement mechanisms have not improved to date. given the 
insurgency, the enforcement mechanisms may have even declined.
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•	 In Iraq’s case, the present extremely low tax structures should not 
have been a contributing factor to the informal economy, but many 
marginal firms do not like to pay any taxes.
•	 The macroeconomy has been relatively stable, but rising inflation 
in some areas may be contributing to an expansion of the informal 
economy.
Of the items noted above, the most critical factor affecting the size of 
the informal economy is no doubt the inability of the Iraqi government 
to control corruption. In addition, given the insurgency and uncertainty 
surrounding political developments, it is safe to say that large segments of 
the population have reverted to the 
survival relationships characteristic 
of the period of sanctions in the 
1990s. This is confirmed daily with 
the news coming out of Iraq describ-
ing economic mismanagement,15 
vast black markets in gasoline,16 
increased crime, and shortages of 
critical inputs.17 These developments 
do not bode well and suggests that 
the current size of the informal 
economy is considerably larger than 
in the late 1990s. As noted above, 
another ominous sign18 is a recently 
released index of corruption for 
2004. The prestigious Transparency 
International Corporation ranks Iraq 
as the most corrupt country in the 
middle East. In 2004 the country’s ranking was 129th out of 145 nations 
worldwide. by 2005 it had fallen to 15 out of 158 countries.19
based on these factors, it is likely that the size of the underground 
economy has expanded significantly beyond the 5 percent of gNP figure, 
noted above, for the end of the Hussein regime. A safe estimate, in light 
of the insurgency and its detrimental impact on investment, electricity, and 
transport, would put the informal economy at around 65 percent of gross 
The most critical fac-
tor affecting the size of 
the informal economy 
is no doubt the inability 
of the Iraqi government 
to control corruption. In 
addition, given the insur-
gency and uncertainty 
surrounding political 
developments, it is safe 
to say that large seg-
ments of the population 
have reverted to survival 
relationships.
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National Product. This figure is reinforced by the unemployment stemming 
from the disbanding of the army and the anti-baathist campaign following 
Saddam’s overthrow.
In addition to the factors noted above, the informal economy may be 
growing simply because of the constraints limiting expansion of formal 
economic activity. Just as private capital formation is often critical to the 
development of a thriving modern economy, social capital creation may 
be just as essential in creating the shift to more formal activities. Again, 
corruption plays a significant role in structuring the informal—this time 
through its effect on the country’s social capital. Figure 1 provides a brief 
sketch of the factors contributing to the growth of the country’s infor-
mal/shadow economy.
The Deterioration in social capital
Social capital refers to networks of relationships that bind people together.20 
Social capitalists distinguish such relationships from physical capital and the 
attributes of individuals, or human capital.21 In the context of Iraqi recon-
struction and the establishment of a market economy, a key element of social 
capital centers on a component of social capital, the notion of trust. 
growing literature22 on social capital stresses the importance of trust in 
the institutional infrastructure of a market economy. The focus on trust is 
inspired by its importance for business formation, which in turn seems to 
be crucial for explaining the variation in economic performance in a large 
cross-section of developing and transition economies. Entrepreneurship 
cannot flourish in an environment of distrust, since many economic oppor-
tunities are closed off. As Nobel laureate, Kenneth Arrow, has noted:
Almost every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, 
certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be plau-
sibly argued that much of economic backwardness in the world can be 
explained by the lack of mutual confidence.2
The transition to a market economy experience of many of the former 
Communist countries suggests successful modernization and development 
take place through a web of diversified social life, mediated by families and 
communities, and the personal relationships of people within them.24 In a 
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similar fashion, Fukuyama25 has identified trust as a central value in pros-
perous, highly productive societies. Trust is a cornerstone of individuals’ 
ability to subordinate their own interests to those of larger groups and to 
associate and cooperate with each other to achieve economic purposes and 
other social satisfactions. 
Trust is such a critical factor in the development of modern economies 
because it motivates contacts with others and opens access for the exchange 
of goods and services. It facilitates cooperation. Cooperation, in turn, breeds 
trust in a two way interaction necessary for the creation of long-term general-
ized norms for cooperation. Social capital thus represents a set of resources 
rooted in networks of relationships 
possessing the power to facilitate 
economic progress. There are three 
types of relationships among parties 
to an economic transaction, giving 
rise three different types of trust:26
1. ascribed Trust. This first type 
of relationship is found among 
kinship groups and family 
members. These relationships 
dominate economic transactions in subsistence economies and still 
characterize reproduction and the household economy (but also many 
small-scale crafts and trades). 
2. process-Based Trust. This type of relationship is between individu-
als that have known each other for a long time, without sharing the 
loyalty to a specific group. most business networks are character-
ized by this type of repeated relationship and the prevalence of what 
develops as a process-based trust.
3. extended Trust. This relationship is between individuals who 
enter into a transaction with only limited information about the 
counterpart’s specific attributes. For economic exchange to take place 
between these types of individuals, generalized or extended trust is 
needed. The importance of this third type of relationship and the 
correspondent economic transactions between largely anonymous 
individuals is a key element of a modern economic system.
Trust is a critical fac-
tor in the development 
of modern economies 
because it motivates 
contacts with others 
and opens access for the 
exchange of goods and 
services. 
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This topology suggests that the building of extended trust is a key 
challenge in Iraq’s development to a modern economy. It is also important 
to bear in mind the relationships between the various forms of trust. In 
particular, extended trust could not exist without the experience of reci-
procity made in repeated interactions among family and other members 
of a societal or business community. Where process-based trust is absent, 
extended trust is unlikely to develop. 
moreover, it is unlikely that extended trust in economic exchange 
could be sustained without the availability of third party enforcement by 
the state. Clearly, trust in government institutions will be a necessary pre-
requisite before Iraq can expect any type of significant expansion of the 
formal economy. Here is where the country’s problems lie. One of the main 
impediments to a formal market in Iraq today is the absence of trust at 
most levels. The ba’athist government created a profound imprint on the 
nature of formal and informal institutions in Iraq. Not only did ba’athism 
hamper the emergence of a market economy, it corrupted the judicial and 
legal institutions needed to create and nurture trust. 
In short, Iraqi values today are no longer those that were reported in 
earlier accounts of the pre-ba’athist period, which stressed the country’s 
vibrant entrepreneurial spirit. Individual and managers’ values have been 
affected by years of repression under authoritarian top-down decision-
making. In an environment of several decades of political and economic 
insecurity, doubt and distrust are deeply entrenched in the individual mind. 
They represent a major constraint against drawing entrepreneurs and indi-
viduals out of the safe, kinship-based informal economy. 
One of the main criticisms of U.S. policy in post-war Iraq has been 
its rejection, not only of social reform, but of the very state-centered 
approaches that were critical to the reconstruction and subsequent economic 
growth in post-war Japan and germany. At the same time, fundamental 
social reforms were ruled out.27 As might be expected, combined with the 
demise of the state as a safety net, the lack of trust in the buying and selling 
of goods and services has resulted in the contemporary Iraqi economy being 
divided into segments of largely non-overlapping networks. 
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ascribed Trust networks
First and by far the largest in number in Iraq are the individual and business 
networks built on ascribed trust. These are usually confined to the local, 
informal economy. most ascribed trust networks involve groups bound 
together by family, tribal, or ethnicity, which facilitates business organiza-
tion built on oral contracts. many of these networks have the potential to 
expand through selective interaction with outsiders. However, such expan-
sion will take time in Iraq, especially under the current conditions of public 
corruption and great uncertainty over the enforceability of contracts.
In today’s Iraq, many ascribed 
trust activities fall in what is com-
monly referred to as the coping 
economy—numerous economic 
interactions during armed conflict 
that provide benefits to the civilian 
population, particularly the poorest 
and most vulnerable. These func-
tions are even more important to 
civilian livelihoods where the formal 
economy and traditional livelihoods 
are destroyed or rendered difficult 
or impossible to sustain. The coping 
economy includes a wide range of 
activities including subsistence agri-
culture, petty trade, and various out 
of the household businesses—cater-
ing, food processing, and the like.
Of the country’s three main economic sectors, it is reasonable to assume 
that the coping economy contains a disproportionate share of the country’s 
poverty. Recent data released by the ministry of Labor and Social Affairs 
indicate that about 5 million Iraqis are living under the poverty line, com-
pared with 14,000 in 199.28 Significantly, the ministry noted that more 
than one million Iraqi women aged 25 to 40 were unmarried, while divorce 
cases were increasing as was child labor. It is reasonable to assume that this 
group of women is firmly entrenched in the coping economy. 
The largest number of 
Iraqi business networks 
are built on ascribed 
trust. These are usually 
confined to the local, 
informal economy. Most 
ascribed trust networks 
involve groups bound 
together by family, 
tribe, or ethnicity, which 
facilitates business orga-
nization built on oral 
contracts. 
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process-Based Trust networks
Second, there are the process-based trust networks reliant on existing ties 
between the previous members of the ba’ath government and criminal 
groups, like smugglers, that thrived during the sanctions period of the 
1990s. Today, these activities are largely in the criminal area. The emergence 
of pervasive criminality was readily apparent soon after the overthrow of 
Saddam Hussein. 
If anything, these problems have become increasingly severe. According 
to a U.N. report, “The emerging crime problem is subtler and scarier: theft, 
extortion, and drug- and arms-smuggling operations that have become 
more sophisticated, more clandestine, and more organized. In baghdad, one 
team of thieves recently burned down a warehouse filled with the hot booty 
of another group. It was one mob sending a message to another.”29 
As in the case of the ascribed trust groups, the activities of these networks 
have been affected by the insurgency. However, process-based networks’ 
activities often directly contribute to prolonging the insurgency through:
•	 The destruction or circumvention of the formal economy and the 
growth of informal and black markets, effectively blurring the lines 
between the formal, informal, and criminal sectors and activities;
•	 Pillage, predation, extortion, and deliberate violence against civil-
ians, used to extort ransoms, capture trade networks and diaspora 
remittances, and exploit labor;
•	 High decentralization, both in the means of coercion and in the 
means of production and exchange;
•	 The use of licit or illicit exploitation of trade in lucrative natural 
resources; 
•	 The reliance on cross-border trading networks, regional kin and 
ethnic groups, arms traffickers, and mercenaries, as well as legally 
operating commercial entities, each of which may have a vested 
interest in the continuation of conflict and instability.
Scores of the cross-border relationships cultivated by the various smug-
gler/criminal groups in the 1990s are still in place and operational at the 
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present time.  goodhand observes that the shadow economy is frequently 
already widespread before the outbreak of conflict and is a permissive fac-
tor for conflict when it contributes to violent state collapse. Or it serves 
as a source of income to would-be rebels. Once conflict erupts, shadow 
economies are easily captured by combatants and thus often become the 
basis for the combat economy.0 This has happened in Iraq, with the cur-
rent wave of kidnappings and smuggling providing significant financial 
assistance to the insurgency.1 
Western intelligence agencies are becoming increasingly worried this 
systematic strengthening of ties between terrorists and organized crime. 
Stefan maier of the german Institute for International and Security Affairs 
confirmed that cooperation between 
the two camps was on the rise, despite 
their different political and economic 
motives.2 As he observes: “Common 
ground between terrorists and orga-
nized criminal groups can be found 
primarily in two areas. First, the two 
come together in money-laundering 
activities: Terrorists often need to 
park their money temporarily with 
somebody else to cover up their 
tracks. Secondly, they need weapons, 
and they usually get them straight 
from organized crime.” 
“With the lack of security mea-
sures, disorganized crime became organized crime,” said Hania mufti, 
baghdad director of Human Rights Watch. “Then, at some point, there 
was a merging between organized crime and political crime.” 
In today’s Iraq, terrorist groups use many of the same channels for 
their activities that the Iraqi government and associated criminal groups 
used in the 1980s and 1990s. In this regard, Iraq is an ideal environment. 
Decades of socialist and statist experiments of the ba’ath Party regime, 
together with subsequent wars and the consequences of UN sanctions, left 
the Iraqi economy heavily damaged, distorted, and exposed to administra-
tive and political interference.4 Within this context, terrorists, insurgents, 
The contention that Mid-
dle East divisions, con-
flicts, and chaos have 
been harnessed by the 
U.S. for its own interests 
is supported only by cir-
cumstantial evidence. In 
the case of Iraq, we can 
find no master plan that 
envisaged a divide-and-
dominate strategy.
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and organized crime elements have been able to thrive through exploiting 
various economic and institutional weaknesses.
extended Trust networks
While extended trust networks may involve some reliance on kinship and 
family relationships, they are largely characterized by transactions between 
largely anonymous individuals. As noted, they are a key element in a modern 
economic system. Since the focus of the present analysis is on the informal 
economy, these networks will not be treated in detail other than to note that 
they are largely undeveloped outside the public sector and the national oil 
industry. Some banking arrangements are moving in this direction, albeit 
extremely slowly.5 
Clearly, for Iraq, the key challenge facing the economy is developing 
the conditions conducive to the creation and growth of extended trust 
networks to encourage the growth and development of this type of network-
ing. Conversely, the lack of supporting institutions has constrained most 
economic agents and those entering the labor market to informal activities 
characterized by family/kinship-based ascribed trust. 
Adding network and labor market conditions to the equation provides 
additional insights to the factors shaping the overall size and, to some 
extent, the composition of Iraq’s contemporary informal economy. These 
are summarized in Figure 1, with the informal economy seen largely as a 
function of fundamental supply and demand factors: (a) a youth population 
bulge, (b) a long-standing state employment program providing incen-
tives for employment in the public, but not private sector, (c) a workforce 
of diminished skills following a long period of sanctions, (d) little private 
sector growth stemming from the instability and the insurgency following 
the overthrow of Saddam Hussein (e) deficient social capital, especially in 
the form of trust, thus confining most private sector transactions to the 
informal market, and (f) openness to trade (neo-liberal reforms) makes 
many potentially profitable firms unprofitable. In turn, the lack of a siz-
able private sector reduces the links often found between the informal and 
formal economy. 
because the informal economy is largely the result of a convergence of 
powerful long-run demographic and economic forces, it will be a fixture 
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for some time to come. At best, informal activities may evolve over the 
next several years with some progression from ascribed-based networks to 
process-based networks. If this transition is viewed as successful by Iraqi 
entrepreneurs and the government makes significant strides in the gover-
nance area, then the progression to process-based networks and extended 
modern networks is a distinct possibility, particularly if the security situation 
stabilizes enough to support foreign direct investment. 
However, a good case can be made that, under current conditions, the 
development and evolution of organized networks may perpetuate and even 
expand the informal/shadow economies. many of the organized networks 
today have evolved out of ba’th party efforts to limit traditional centers 
of tribal authority. In effect, the ba’th party encouraged the growth and 
proliferation of informal associational links locally. 
evoLuTIon of LocaL neTWorks36
more precisely, local-level kinship affiliation was increasingly encouraged 
as the effects of the 1980s war with Iran and the sanctions of the 1990s 
drained the power of the central government. Particularly after the 2001 
gulf War, the central government was weakened to the extent that it was 
unable to perform many of its traditional military, economic and security 
functions.7 
The ba’thist survival strategy during this period was for the party to 
serve as a broad tribal unit with local associations performing in supporting 
roles. by 1996, officially sanctioned “tribes” were responsible not only for 
the maintenance of law and order locally, but also collected taxes on behalf 
of the government, were appointed judicial powers and extended tribal 
customary law to the extent of their territorial reach. They received arms 
and ammunition, vehicles, and logistical support as payment for services 
rendered to the party.
Local dominance of revived tribal networks was evident in the 1998 
crisis involving the United States. At that time, heavily armed and equipped 
Sunni tribal units were positioned in and around baghdad to control the res-
tive urban population, a role formerly belonging to the ba’th party militia. 
With time the interests of the central government and local networks began 
to diverge. Clan-based groups controlled the highways around baghdad. 
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They increasingly turned to criminal activities—looting, smuggling, and 
hijacking throughout most of al Anbar province. Conditions deteriorated 
to the extent that convoys were necessary even for basic travel in daylight 
to avoid raids by tribal guerillas. 
by 2000, policeman, judges, and party officials were subject to violent 
tribal recriminations. Encounters between Iraqi soldiers and tribal irregulars, 
especially those based in Al Anbar province escalated in terms of frequency 
and scale. In this ever more lawless environment, tribal elements began to 
take over many of the local, informal street-markets. These markets com-
prised a sub-stratum of the informal Iraqi economy that, as noted above, 
began to grow in the early 1980s as a result of chronic resource scarcities 
brought on by war, unrest, and a decade of sanctions. 
In addition, Saddam Hussein’s selective distribution of increasingly 
scarce resources created some of the underlying group rivalries that exist 
today. by directing funds, rations, 
government positions, electricity, 
clean water, fuel and industrial invest-
ment toward specific villages in the 
western Sunni regions in exchange 
for service to the regime, and with-
holding resources to other villages as 
a punitive mechanism, a local-level 
competitive calculus developed that 
was perpetuated by Hussein as an instrument for rule. because the state-
level formal economy was dramatically curtailed by sanctions, this competi-
tion for resources further encouraged the growth of informal activities and 
employment.
The tendency of corrupt party and state institutions to favor key 
supporters and engage in fraud in the distribution of goods and services 
encouraged those operating in the informal (and formal) economy to 
rely on local level mediation by tribal groups. because informal activity is 
based in large part on social capital—the trusted familial and kinship ties 
noted above—local tribal groups played a central role in the expansion 
of the informal economy. by assessing fees for the settlement of disputes 
and collecting taxes on local production, local tribal groups also began to 
establish financial support free of state control.
Saddam Hussein’s 
selective distribution 
of increasingly scarce 
resources created some 
of the underlying group 
rivalries that exist today. 
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Tribal groups were also increasingly involved in criminal-type activi-
ties, especially in the western border regions. Illicit criminal networks were 
initially based on the cross-border smuggling of animals, tea, alcohol, and 
electronics. Later these activities began encompassing the drug trade. Tribal-
based organized criminal activities increased toward the end of ba’thist rule 
with many party members becoming involved due to declining opportuni-
ties to acquire official resources. by early 2002, the entire route along the 
Euphrates River in Al Anbar had essentially developed into a sanctuary for 
illicit traffickers and criminal entrepreneurs. 
Resource scarcity and the stature of sub-tribal groups were both greatly 
enhanced at the local level following the removal of Saddam Hussein:
•	 The Coalition Provisional Authority’s (CPA) early adoption of a 
neo-liberal economic program impeded the growth of regulatory 
and legal institutions. This institutional vacuum forced businesses 
and those entering the labor market to rely on the trusted kinship 
or extended family networks of the informal economy.
•	 Shortages of critical inputs such as electricity and fuel, and the dan-
gers of transportation further encouraged informal entrepreneurs 
to rely on tribal and extended family associations for protection and 
support.
•	 As noted above, endemic corruption and uncertainty have contrib-
uted to a dramatic increase in the informal sector following the 200 
invasion. As a result, approximately eighty percent of the labor force 
is now engaged informally, accounting for nearly two-thirds of Iraq’s 
gross domestic product.
•	 growth of the informal economy is particularly evident in certain 
areas west of the capital, where the destruction of the Sunni-oriented 
military establishment and related industries has contributed to a 
substantial contraction of formal activities and jobs.
•	 A principle driver of this growth has been a dramatic rise in criminal 
activity related to he shadow economy and dominated by local-level 
tribal elements, including the emerging economies based on the 
distribution of scarce resources, kidnapping, trafficking in petrol, 
narcotics, looted weaponry, and the targeting of coalition forces.
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•	 In areas beyond the control of the Iraqi government and lacking a 
substantial coalition presence, the shadow economy is rapidly displac-
ing any legal or semi-legal structures that may have survived until 
the present.
The removal of the Hussein regime and the actions of the CPA pre-
sented a range of opportunities and constraints that have in part determined 
the manner in which street-level groups have mobilized and generated new 
opportunities and constraints for both the original organizations and fol-
low-on groups over time. This evolution has gone through three distinct 
phases: (1) march 200-December 200; (2) December 200-January 
2005; and () January 2005 to the present.
march 2003-December 2003
During this initial phase, the persistent lack of security and the policy 
directives issued by the CPA accounted for the greatest opportunities for 
armed groups to expand their positions locally. Within this period the 
most prominent actors at the street-level in term of mobilization potential, 
organization and stature within the surrounding community were those 
legacy groups of local/kinship-based “tribal” associations reminiscent of 
the period under sanctions.
These groups are composed of pre-existing social groups (some former 
regime elements, and perhaps regime opponents) within the tribe that come 
armed and equipped, and they are activated by conflict, inspired leadership 
and the prospect of loot.
A second tier of gangs was comprised of those groups engaged in entre-
preneurial and organized criminal activities, also a legacy of the sanctions. 
These gangs are largely based on local associations. While there is some 
degree of overlap between these two tiers, the fact that many tribal groups 
maintained militias precisely to protect their local economic interests from 
ba’th encroachment prevented an alignment between these two groups—at 
least in the immediate aftermath of the invasion.
The chaotic lawlessness of this period presented a significant opportunity 
for groups in both tiers to solidify and extend their presence locally. Hesi-
tation on the part of coalition forces to manage the deteriorating security 
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situation in most urban centers, particularly baghdad, acted as a catalyst in 
the very process of institutional devolution that had been occurring under 
the Hussein regime. The vacuum that developed in the weeks following 
the invasion increased the scale and intensity of this process as the role 
of self-protecting mutual assurance groups responded to the precipitous 
decline in law and order.
In sum, CPA policies of “de-bathification,” disbanding of the Iraqi 
national army, and the Coalition’s ambivalence toward the rise of militias 
presented a second opportunity for street-level gangs to expand their influ-
ence and control of resources. by the closing months of 200 the die had 
been cast.
December 2003-January 2005
Hostilities between coalition troops 
and local populations, the inability of 
coalition forces to adequately repress 
insurgent violence, and the return 
of sovereignty to the Iraqi govern-
ment provided the most significant 
opportunities for the various local 
networks to expand during this sec-
ond period. 
First, the dominant groups at 
this stage reflected a three tiered 
structure. The networks corresponding to the two most prominent groups 
began exhibiting a high degree of overlap: 
•	 The combination of tribally-based former security personnel and 
criminal groups comprised the first tier.
•	 The second and third tiers were occupied by indigenous ele-
ments motivated by vendetta, and extremist Islamic ideologies, 
respectively.
•	 Factors such as the collateral costs of the Fallujah operations and the 
abuse of detainees at Abu ghraib represented a substantial political 
CPA policies of “de-
Bathification,” disband-
ing of the Iraqi national 
army, and the Coalition’s 
ambivalence toward the 
rise of militias presented 
a second opportunity 
for street-level gangs to 
expand their influence 
and control of resources. 
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opportunity by further legitimizing the existence of armed street-
level groups. 
This environment facilitated the emergence of the second and third tier 
of violent street-level actors. These actors, predominantly foreign in the latter 
case, were easily absorbed by the expanding networks of street-level groups. 
These groups provided both the means and an added incentive to engage 
in anti-coalition targeting by offering generous monetary incentives. 
This pattern of network evolution was further stimulated by shifting 
budgetary patterns after June 2004—the time the CPA transferred control 
of government portfolios and the national budget to Iraqi ministries. This 
shift in budgetary authority represented a political opportunity for the 
street-level groups. Specifically, the allocation of state assets reflected a new 
budgetary dynamic that tended to favor those interests centered in baghdad 
over the remote provincial areas. As 
a result, the capacity of the coalition 
to respond to conflict conditions and 
proceed with reconstruction was seri-
ously weakened.
Second, newly appointed minis-
ters fostered a climate of parochial-
ism by attempting to establish an 
independent, self-supporting infra-
structure within the new institutions 
under their control. The relationship 
between the ministries of Interior and 
Defense is instructive. both ministries 
assumed control of an array of smaller “special” units comprised of thou-
sands of supporters and local affiliates, sustained by diverted funds intended 
for aid and reconstruction. 
January 2005 to the present
In addition to a continuation of many of the dynamics noted above, this 
period has been marked by a set of new opportunities created by elite cleav-
ages within the National Assembly, the increased politicization of militias 
This environment facili-
tated the emergence of 
the second and third tier 
of violent street-level 
actors. These actors, 
predominantly foreign 
in the latter case, were 
easily absorbed by the 
expanding networks of 
street-level groups.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE
VOL. XXIII NO. 4  DECEmbER 2006 2
THE IRAqI ImPASSE: SUSTAININg ECONOmIC RECONSTRUCTION
and the continued expansion of the shadow economy.
Changes in the street-level dynamic have been consistent with the 
opportunities for expansion. Again a first-tier of networks exists, possessing 
a high degree of overlap between entrepreneurial and organized criminal 
networks. They are comprised largely of Iraqis harboring some form of 
vendetta or personal grievance against the coalition. A second tier of actors 
is comprised of foreign and domestic Islamic extremists. 
As in the earlier two periods, demand for weapons, stolen goods, and 
hostages determine the roles and relationships between street-level actors 
more so than ideological or political convictions. Yet in this phase, engage-
ment in the black market has not merely enabled sustained street-level 
activity, it has in many cases become the activity itself, dominating collective 
resources and driving group expansion in terms of capabilities and reach. 
The shift is evident in certain portions of Al Anbar province where despite 
frequency of anti-coalition targeting, criminal endeavors are now thought to 
account for the bulk of street-level activity. Clearly the draw of the shadow 
economy is a major factor tending to decrease the likelihood that Sunni 
groups will participate more in the political process in the near term. 
Summing up the evolution of local network development in Iraq, a 
pattern emerges whereby during each phase of the post-war period the posi-
tion of locally-oriented armed groups has been solidified and expanded in 
a manner consistent with the type and timing of the political opportunities 
available. The most significant opportunities have included:
•	 The slow recognition of security conditions facilitated the establish-
ment of armed groups in the first phase. This first phase also rep-
resents the playing out of the structural conditions stemming from 
the sanctions regime.
•	 An appreciable shift in the street-level dynamic in terms of the relative 
predominance of certain actors in the second and third phases. This 
transition has favored the position of indigenous groups radicalized 
through interaction with the coalition, with a higher degree of overlap 
between all groups and the shadow economy in the current phase. 
State-level political openings may lure some elements of resistance 
into the political process, but in the present phase, the draw of the shadow 
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economy may be sufficiently strong to keep groups engaged in street-level 
violence.
assessmenT
Several years have passed since the removal of Saddam Hussein, yet there 
are few indications that the degree of Sunni-led violence will decline. On 
the contrary, violent activity has increased in frequency and scale. 
The evolution of local insurgent/criminal networks in Iraq suggests 
several mechanisms that that are consistent with this acceleration of violence. 
One theory associated with the theory of third generation gangs, or the g2 
model,8 provides valuable insights as to the manner in which these groups 
are likely to evolve and the best methods to arrest their development. 
Specifically, the g2 model suggests that armed groups function within 
a rationally bounded and organized space that is responsive to forces affect-
ing the calculus and outcomes of group behavior. When modified by state 
authorities, these forces represent potential opportunities to minimize, 
deflect, or redirect the activities of the group.
many of the structural conditions found in Iraq are key constructs 
of the g2 model. In particular, the existence of violent networks in the 
context of a state that is constrained by minimal capacity, poor economic 
performance, and significant social and political disparities are key elements 
of the model. The g2 model also assumes that self-protecting solidarity 
groups are heavily engaged in the informal and criminal economies at the 
local level. Insurgent/criminal networks in Iraq are analogous to the form 
and functions performed by street-level gangs—the basic element of the 
g2 concept.
As the g2 model would predict, insurgent and criminal groups in 
Iraq have expanded their economic and political positions vis a vis the state 
through corruption and intimidation. Further, the model posits that g2 
actors themselves initiate this process for the purpose of establishing lawless 
areas and criminal enclaves or quasi-states. 
On the other hand, certain causal relationships in Iraq differ from those 
posited by the g2 approach. In particular, roles of local networks and 
the state are reversed. Starting with Saddam in the 1980s, the incremental 
decline of the capacity and presence of the Iraqi state, combined with the 
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sate-initiated scheme to retain power facilitated the expanded role the role 
of local-level groups. In fact, Saddam’s approach during austere times was 
to compel local groups to fill the political and security vacuum produced 
by institutional retrenchment. 
The process continued after Saddam’s fall—nearly all of the available 
political space with the exception of state-level ministerial portfolios had 
been effectively abandoned to local forces. In Iraq, the extent of corruption 
and intimidation exercised by insurgent and criminal groups has resulted 
from state retreat. As normally constructed, the g2 model assumes criminal 
networks encroaching on the state. 
The Iraq case suggests several 
modifications of the g2 model are 
necessary to better understand the 
dynamics unfolding in that country. 
In particular, the end-state of the 
dynamic group processes currently 
underway are groups of lawless crimi-
nal enclaves or quasi-states stemming 
from the state’s inability to provide 
essential social, economic and secu-
rity functions. 
On the other hand the present 
system may exhibit some stability. 
As the quasi-states take on the local 
functions of providing security and 
access to resources, they tend to favor 
a certain degree of stability and ever-increasing levels of market access. 
The competitive dynamic between these quasi-states may produce a status 
quo that preserves the structure of the declining state. The state structure 
persists not in spite of the proliferation of quasi-states but precisely as a 
result of this process. This dynamic may explain some of the stability and 
security in Iraq in the absence of effective national government. 
•	 First, insurgent group activity can be viewed as a cumulative effect 
of the structural forces prevalent in Iraq. The choice to engage in 
violence is one element of a strategic rational formed by conditions 
Many of the structural 
conditions found in Iraq 
are key constructs of 
the 3G2 model. In par-
ticular, the existence of 
violent networks in the 
context of a state that is 
constrained by minimal 
capacity, poor economic 
performance, and signifi-
cant social and political 
disparities are key ele-
ments of the model.
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of scarcity and the functions armed groups perform locally. This 
rationale also shapes the competitive dynamic that drives political 
and economic expansion.
•	 Second, the behavior of locally-based armed groups can be affected 
by manipulating societal and local-level factors, the most significant 
of which are: (a) economic conditions especially the growth of the 
informal economy, (b) competition between entrepreneurial and 
criminal/insurgent networks linked to the informal/shadow econo-
mies, and (c) the openness of the legitimate political sphere.
•	 Finally, these and other inputs into the g2 framework can be 
expected to generate certain outcomes stemming from group/net-
work evolution from the street level.
The acceleration in violence in Iraq throughout most of 2006 sug-
gests that the informal and shadow sectors will continue to dominate the 
economic landscape in the near term and will likely grow as the markets 
associated with insurgent violence expand. The criminal economies based 
on theft, weapons trading, mercenary kidnappings, black-market smuggling 
and arbitrage that have become the cornerstone of insurgent mobilization 
will continue to operate with very few constraints and will likely increase 
in proportion to increasing levels of violence.
In the current phase, competition is actually fueling the expansion of 
the underground economy in addition to the increased appropriation of 
market segments by combatants. When viewed in the context of the g2 
model, the structural setting presently observed in Iraq suggests the con-
tinuous and unconstrained expansion of insurgent group capabilities well 
into the future:
1. The tendency of insurgent groups to capture sectors of the growing 
informal and criminal economies will increase. This in combination 
with the growing political stature of armed groups and a liberal-
izing Iraqi state favors some type of criminal enclaves or quasi-state 
development in parallel to legitimate state structures.
2. Armed groups will function as the shadow or de-facto governments 
within these enclaves providing the services and performing the tasks 
reflective of their local orientation.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE
VOL. XXIII NO. 4  DECEmbER 2006 27
THE IRAqI ImPASSE: SUSTAININg ECONOmIC RECONSTRUCTION
. The structure of the legitimate Iraqi state will survive and may even 
thrive in those areas outside insurgent influence.
4. Locally-oriented armed groups can be expected to expand from the 
street to the sub-national level, evolving from mutually protective 
solidarity groups into prominent political and economic actors.
The degree of intensity of insurgent violence is increasing and this trend 
is likely to continue. Coalition forces confronting this challenge have been 
thrust into an environment of great uncertainty. Coalition forces on the 
ground are facing a variety of threats from across the spectrum of violent 
actors. The different motivations and relationships between these groups 
are gradually emerging:
•	 Indigenous and transnational actors are establishing links and mag-
nifying their capabilities in ways that are consistent with the rapidly 
changing information-age environment.
•	 The traditional distinctions between violent groups seeking political 
goals and those pursuing profit are becoming blurred.
Summing up, an adapted version of the g2 model provides useful 
insights into the Sunni-led insurgency that the general guidelines currently 
in use tend to overlook. Those guidelines depict the insurgent threat as a 
discrete collection of actors motivated by a combination of nihilistic range, 
primordial tribal grievances or a desire to restore the former grandeur of 
the ba’th party.
In contrast, the g2 model identifies the societal-level conditions affect-
ing the origins, development and orientation of armed groups, the political 
role that these groups embrace over time and the relationships between 
groups that span the local, regional and global levels of interactions.
These factors culminate most forcefully at the street level, where the 
relationships between groups are characterized by violence and competition. 
The integrated model highlights certain critical junctures where these rela-
tionships can be altered and exploited to better combat the insurgency.
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concLusIon—hope for The fuTure
The integrated model shows that insurgent-group activity can be viewed as 
part of the continued effects of the structural forces prevalent in Iraq. The 
choice to engage in violence is one element of a strategic rationale informed 
by conditions of scarcity and the functions armed groups perform locally. 
This rationale also shapes the competitive dynamic that drives the expansion 
of insurgent groups into the political and economic realms. Therefore, the 
behavior of locally-based groups can be affected by manipulating societal 
and local-level factors, the most significant of which are the size and com-
position of the underground/shadow economy and the openness of the 
legitimate political sphere. These areas comprise the key vulnerabilities of 
the insurgent/criminal groups in Iraq:
Resolving critical shortages and introducing balanced reforms in the 
formal sector will slow or reverse the growth of the informal and shadow 
economies. These measures would significantly undercut street-level 
mobilization structures by co-opting the functions of tribal and sub-tribal 
groups while diminishing the pull of the shadow economy which fuels 
insurgent activity. Openness at the political level would similarly undercut 
or co-opt the rising political stature of armed leaders by channeling them 
into a legitimate political process. 
Clearly, greater emphasis should be placed on limiting the growth of 
the informal and criminal economies, which are easily captured by criminal/
insurgent networks. Iraq’s present set of economic policies are legacies of the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) period. As in many other developing 
countries, they were intended to produce a thriving, free market economy. 
These policies reflect much of the reform agenda commonly known as the 
Washington Consensus, emphasizing fiscal discipline, re-prioritization of 
public expenditures, privatization, trade liberalization, deregulation, foreign 
direct investment, property rights and good governance in general.9 Three 
years later many of these reforms are only partially or haphazardly in place, 
contributing the expansion of the vibrant informal and shadow economies 
at the expense of formal sector development. 
One course of action is to try and press ahead with the completion of 
market reforms. However, given the current political atmosphere in bagh-
dad with so many government officials having a vested interest in preserving 
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their lucrative links to black markets and the underground economy, this is 
unlikely to occur until major strides are made toward controlling corrup-
tion. Even price reforms will take time to begin slowing the growth of the 
underground markets. For example, while gas prices are gradually rising as 
part of an International monetary Fund (ImF) program,40 the impact on 
the shadow economy has been affected by the oil price differential between 
Iraq and its neighbors. 
Another approach is to re-introduce many of the pre-200 state-based 
social services with emphasis placed on slowing or reversing the impetus 
to join the informal and shadow economies. These measures would sig-
nificantly undercut street-level mobilization structures by co-opting the 
functions of tribal and sub-tribal groups while diminishing the pull of the 
shadow economy that fuels insurgent activity.
A variant on this course of action would be the reorientation of eco-
nomic programs from the post-war centralized top-down orientation toward 
one that is decentralized and inclusive. This reorientation is likely to erode 
somewhat the popular or at least passive support for the insurgency—the 
more people with a stake in the decision-making process and economic 
outcomes, the more they will participate in building a new Iraq.
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healing of the world.”
—Rev. Ray H. Kiely, D.D. 
The Near East School of Theology 
Beirut, Lebanon
“Henry L. Ruf’s book World Religions In a 
Postmodern Age is a bold undertaking that 
addresses a number of important issues for 
religious people living in a postmodern age, 
such as: Is rationally defensible religion 
even possible after postmodern critiques of 
religion? If it is, what if anything can be sal-
vaged from previous religious traditions? And 
what should be the religious person’s attitude 
toward other religions? Ruf argues that a 
rationally defensible postmodern religion is 
possible and that, despite their differences, 
world religions share common features and 
ethical commitments that can be appealed to 
as a basis for dialogue and tolerance. These 
are issues which should concern everyone 
living in a postmodern, culturally and reli-
giously divided world. I highly recommend 
the book.” 
—Gene G. James, Professor of Philosophy,
 Unviersity of Memphis
ISbN: 9781557788665, Paper, 50 pages
“This is the book for my Phi-
losophy of Religion course that I 
have been waiting for! Professor 
Ruf’s outstanding scholarship is 
complemented by his exceptional 
writing and wide-ranging grasp of 
the matter.”
—John N. Vielkind, Ph.D. 
Professor & Chair in Philosophy
 Marshall University, Huntington WV
A call for religious 
liberty and a new 
ecumenism.
